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ABSTRACT
We examine the implications for borrowing costs of including collective-action clauses in loan
contracts.  For a sample of some 2,000 international bonds, we compare the spreads on bonds subject
to UK governing law, which typically include collective-action clauses, with spreads on bonds subject
to US law, which do not.  Contrary to the assertions of some market participants, we find that
collective-action clauses in fact reduce the cost of borrowing for more credit-worthy issuers, who
appear to benefit from the ability to avail themselves of an orderly restructuring process.  In contrast,
less credit-worthy issuers pay, if anything, higher spreads.  We conjecture that for less credit-worthy
borrowers the advantages of orderly restructuring are offset by the moral hazard and default risk
associated with the presence of renegotiation-friendly loan provisions.
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Collective-action clauses to facilitate the orderly restructuring of problem debts are one of
the key elements of the so-called new international financial architecture.  There is now
widespread agreement that the International Monetary Fund should no longer provide large-scale
financial assistance to prop up shaky currency pegs and bail out private investors (see e.g. Council
on Foreign Relations 1999), but any such commitment, by the IMF or the international policy
community more generally, will lack credibility so long as there do not exist other ways of
resolving financial crises.  A loss of investor confidence that causes capital flows to reverse
direction, forcing an abrupt devaluation and increasing the burden of interest and amortization,
can make it impossibly expensive for an emerging-market economy to keep current on its external
debts.  But because debt restructuring is so costly and disruptive, the international policy
community is reluctant to contemplate this scenario.  Hence, the IMF’s commitment not to run to
the rescue of a shaky currency peg and to provide the hard currency needed to pay off private
investors may lack credibility.  The consequent expectation that an international rescue operation
will be mounted, IMF statements to the contrary notwithstanding, therefore continues to create
moral hazard in international financial markets.
This is the problem that collective-action clauses are designed to solve.  While such
clauses have long been included in syndicated bank loan contracts, they are typically absent from
bonds issued under U.S. law.  These American-style bonds lack sharing clauses to discourage
maverick investors from resorting to lawsuits and other ways of obstructing settlements beneficial
to the debtor and the majority of creditors alike.  They require the unanimous consent of
bondholders to any restructuring, creating almost insurmountable hurdles to orderly negotiations
to alter payment terms.  They lack clauses specifying who represents the bondholders and making1  Folkerts-Landau (1999), p.2.
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provision for a bondholders committee or assembly.  
The addition of sharing, majority-voting and collective-representation clauses to bond
contracts was thus suggested by the G10 in its post mortem on the Mexican crisis and echoed in a
series of G7 and G22 reports and declarations (see Group of Ten 1996, Group of Twenty Two
1998, Group of Seven 1998).  The G-7 subsequently placed the issue on its work program for
reforming the international financial system.  U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin endorsed it in
a speech designed to set the agenda for the spring 1999 meetings of the IMF’s Interim Committee
(Rubin 1999).  G7 finance ministers embraced it in their Cologne Summit report on strengthening
the international financial architecture (Group of Seven 1999). 
Yet words have not led to deeds.  This lack of progress is attributable in turn to the
opposition of the markets and some developing countries.  Collective-action clauses, they object,
would raise borrowing costs.  Easier restructuring, by heightening the temptation for borrowers to
walk away from their debts, would render the markets reluctant to lend.  The consequences would
include “a prohibitive increase in borrowing costs at a time when trillions of dollars are needed for
infrastructure finance in [developing]... countries.”
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The rebuttal is that making provision for orderly restructuring could render emerging-
market issues more attractive by minimizing acrimonious disputes, unproductive negotiations, and
extended periods when no debt service is paid and growth is depressed by a suffocating debt
overhang.  As The Economist put it in a recent article, “the prospect of an orderly renegotiation2  Economist (1999), p.21.
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rather than a messy default might actually make some bonds more attractive.”
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The analogy with domestic bankruptcy procedures supports this more optimistic
interpretation.  Few market participants presumably would argue for the abolition of bankruptcy
laws and the reinstatement of debtor’s prison to discourage borrowers from walking away from
their debts; they would acknowledge the need to balance the ex ante bonding role against the ex
post efficiency advantages of being able to restructure problem debts.  To be sure, recent
proposals may move too far from one extreme to the other.  Given the legal immunity sovereign
borrowers enjoy and the special difficulties of seizing the assets of foreign borrowers in general, it
could be that collective-action clauses would too seriously weaken the bonding role of debt,
resulting in a prohibitive rise in the cost of borrowing for emerging markets.  But this is an
empirical question.
It is a question informed by remarkably little evidence.  This is perplexing, since there in
fact exists a market in London on which British-style bonds with collective-action clauses are
issued and traded.  Comparisons of the spreads on these bonds with spreads on otherwise
equivalent American-style instruments are an obvious way of evaluating the afore-mentioned
arguments.  
In practice, the comparison is not straightforward.  Not only does one have to control for
borrower characteristics and market conditions affecting emerging-market spreads, but the choice
of governing law is presumably endogenous.  Borrowers who anticipate having to restructure may3  American-style bonds may be preferred, in other words, because the inability to reschedule and the
reputational damage on account of outright default renders to such debt a de facto senior status.
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be attracted to instruments that anticipate this eventuality, as may be lenders who value quick
resolution.  Alternatively, borrowers thought likely to default on their obligations may incur the
greatest surcharge if they issue a bond with collective-action provisions, encouraging them to opt
for bonds that exclude these clauses.
3 
In addition, there is the fact that not all borrowers will be in the market at all times.  When
financial conditions tighten, for example, high-risk borrowers tend to be rationed out of the
market.  This selectivity will bias ordinary-least squares estimates of the relationship between
characteristics of the borrower and his loan contract, on the one hand, and the spread he pays, on
the other.  This bias will contaminate efforts to recover the impact of collective-action clauses on
spreads even when these control for the endogeneity of the choice of governing law.
This does not mean that collective-action clauses are impossible to analyze, only that this
must be done using a framework that takes these problems into account.  In this paper we develop
such a framework.  We attempt account both for the endogeneity of the choice of governing law
and for changes in the composition of the pool of borrowers.  We implement the model using data
on emerging market bonds for the period 1991-1998.
The results suggest that collective-action provisions in fact reduce borrowing costs for the
most credit-worthy issuers, who benefit from being able to avail themselves of orderly
restructuring.  Less credit-worthy issuers, in contrast, do not enjoy lower spreads; if anything, the4   For details on the material in this section, see Buchheit (1998a, b, c).
5  Many bonds provide for lowering the necessary quorum to 25 per cent if 75 per cent of the
bondholders cannot be reached.
6  Although there are exceptions.  Some US-style bonds also provide for amendments, even to
payment terms, with the approval of a qualified majority of bondholders.
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opposite is true.  We conjecture that for less credit-worthy borrowers the advantages of
provisions enabling restructuring are offset by the moral hazard and default risk associated with
the presence of renegotiation-friendly loan provisions.
 
2.  Background
International bonds governed by UK law typically include provisions aimed at ameliorating
collective-action problems.
4  They enable the holders of debt securities to call a bondholder
assembly with the power to appoint a representative to negotiate with the debtor.  That assembly
can pass extraordinary resolutions addressing issues relating to the settlement of defaults or other
modifications to the original bond covenant subject to the consent of bondholders holding a clear
majority of the outstanding principal (typically, 75 per cent).
5  Its resolutions are binding on all
bondholders so long as the requisite majority has agreed.  In contrast, many US-style bonds do
not even provide for an assembly, precluding any effort to modify payment terms (and other
bondholder rights) without the consent of each and every bondholder.
6  
Bonds governed by UK law specify procedures for selecting a bondholder’s representative
and enumerate his responsibilities.  This representative (typically the trustee) is empowered to7  It is important to distinguish here between litigation and acceleration.  Even in U.S.-style bonds
with a fiscal agent, acceleration by individual bondholders may be restricted in some cases.
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communicate the bondholders’ negotiating terms to the debtor.  Bonds governed by U.S. law, in
contrast, provide for a fiscal agent, but this entity lacks the power to represent the bondholders in
negotiations.  (Some UK-style bonds provide for a fiscal agent as well.)  The fiscal agent is an
agent of the issuer rather than of the bondholders.  His responsibilities are essentially
administrative: he keeps track of interest and amortization payments and distributes these to the
holders of the debt securities. 
UK bonds governed by Trustee Deed Agreements, but not those involving fiscal agents,
generally prohibit individual bondholders from initiating litigation.  The power to do so is vested
with the trustee, acting on the instruction of creditors holding a specified fraction (typically, at
least 25 per cent) of the principal, who is required to distribute any funds recovered in proportion
to the principal amount.  De facto, then, these bonds include the equivalent of sharing clauses and
offer the debtor some protection against litigation.  American-style bonds, in contrast, include no
such limits on litigation and no requirement to share the proceeds with other bondholders.
7
How could debt contracts have evolved so differently in the United States and United
Kingdom?  The divergence appear to date only to the U.S. Trust Indenture Act of 1939.  Section
316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act, which applies to the publicly-traded bonds of corporate
issuers, prohibits any reduction in the amounts due a bondholder without that bondholder’s
consent.  This regulation was adopted in response to the belief that corporate insiders had taken
advantage of bondholders in the widespread defaults of the early 1930s by forcing through8 Launch spreads were not reported for 358 bonds; these were principally bonds issued in
currencies other than the U.S. dollar, the Japanese Yen, and the German Deutsche Mark.  For
1997 and 1998, we do have spreads on Italian Lira bonds, which increased in frequency in these
years, and also on bonds denominated in British pounds.  For purposes of the regression analysis,
we lost an additional 44 observations owing to the absence of complementary country
characteristics.
 
9  For 133 bonds, no law was specified.  We have included them in the “other” laws category. 
Also, three bonds had both UK and U.S. laws. We have categorized these as U.S. law bonds
(though none of our results is sensitive to this procedure).
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restructurings that enriched the holders of equity at the expense of holders of debt.  New York-
law sovereign bond documentation since 1939 has generally followed the precedent set by the
Trust Indenture Act in shunning collective-action clauses even though the rationale for Section
316(b) does not obviously apply to sovereigns.
Thus, the different provisions of U.S. and UK bond issues would appear to be an example
of historical path dependence, in which historical events in the distant past continue to influence
arrangements and outcomes in the present (Roe 1987).
3.  Bond Issuance Under Different Laws
Our data, drawn from the Capital Bondware database and augmented for the early 1990s
by the International Monetary Fund’s Emerging Market Group, is composed of 2619 bonds.  In
principle, this is the universe of all fixed and floating rate bonds issued between 1991 and 1998 by
emerging markets.
8  1160 bonds were subject to UK governing law, 840 to U.S. law, and the rest
to other laws (mainly Japanese and German).
9  (See Table 1.)  This high level of issuance under
UK law is not obviously consistent with the view that the market has a visceral aversion to10We return to this point below.
11 That these are launch spreads is important, since spreads at the time of issue behave differently
than spreads on the secondary market.  In particular, in poor market conditions when secondary
spreads rise, launch spreads generally fall. This reflects the tendency for the number of issues to
decline and for only the most creditworthy borrowers to come to the market when global financial
conditions tighten.  We return to this below.
12  The comparison is not possible for other regions (the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, for
example), since we do not always observe bonds subject to both governing laws.  This underscores
the importance of modeling governing law as a choice variable, as we do below.
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collective-action clauses.  Note also that public issuers other than sovereigns have a greater
tendency to issue bonds governed by UK law than sovereigns and private issuers (Table 2).  East
Asian borrowers tend to issue more frequently under UK law than borrowers from other
regions.
10
Spreads for bonds subject to UK law have been lower through most of the 1990s than
bonds subject to U.S. law.
 11  This differential, while not large, is consistent over time (Table 1). 
It not consistent across regions or types of borrowers.  While East Asian issuers appear to pay
lower spreads under UK law, the same is not true of Latin American and Eastern European
borrowers.  Private and non-sovereign public borrowers pay lower spreads under UK law, but not
sovereigns.
12  
These patterns suggest that different borrowers may be affected differently by collective-
action clauses.  They point to the possibility that more credit-worthy borrowers (East Asians as
opposed to Latin Americans for much of the 1990s) may enjoy lower spreads when their bonds
are subject to renegotiation-friendly UK governing law, in contrast to less credit-worthy
borrowers, for whom the advantages of provisions facilitating orderly restructuring may be offset13This is emphasized by Petas and Rahman (1999).  Pointing in the same direction is the fact that the
maturity of bonds tends to be relatively low in both the lowest and highest credit rating categories.
It would appear that while issuers with low credit quality are constrained to low maturities by the
market, issuers with higher credit quality value the bonding role of short-term debt.
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by moral hazard and additional default risk.  Similarly, there is a hint that creditors prefer US law
when lending to sovereigns because of the moral hazard associated with the combination of easy
restructuring and sovereign immunity.  
On average, bonds issued under “other laws” carry lower spreads.  We suspect that this is
picking up the impact on spreads of borrowers’ ability to access the German and, particularly, the
Japanese market, where for much of the period funds were cheap and plentiful.  This makes it
hard to know what the low spreads on these issues really reflect.  We focus, therefore, on the
comparison between bonds subject to UK and U.S. laws. 
Figure 1 underscores that analyzing the implications of the legal provisions of spreads
requires going beyond simple comparisons.  There, issuers are categorized by their Institutional
Investor country credit rating.  The frequency of a bond being governed by UK law relative to
U.S. law (henceforth we refer to this as the ratio of bonds subject to UK law) is highest in the
highest credit-rating categories.  Thus, a common omitted variable -- credit quality -- could
conceivably explain the apparent association between issuance under UK law and low average
spread.  Note, however, that the lowest credit rating category, 0-30, also has a relatively high
ratio of bonds subject to UK law, consistent with the notion that provisions facilitating orderly
restructuring are valued when the likelihood of default is high.
13  Again, this points to the potential
for simple comparisons to mislead.14 We have shown elsewhere (Eichengreen and Mody 1998a) that in periods when investor sentiment
toward emerging markets is favorable, average (primary) spreads on new issues tend to be high, since
a large number of (less credit-worthy) issuers come to the market.  Conversely, in periods when
investor sentiment turns against emerging markets, only countries with good credit ratings are able
to access the market; hence primary spreads tend to fall with the volume of new issues.
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Figure 2 underscores the importance of controlling for endogeneity and selectivity when
analyzing the impact of different governing laws.  There is a strong inverse correlation between
the ratio of bonds issued under UK law and their spreads relative to U.S.-law bonds, as if
borrowers respond to price incentives.  But the fact that the average spread (averaged over both
markets) covaries positively with the ratio of UK law to US law spreads suggests that the
phenomenon is in fact more complicated.  Following the Mexican crisis, sentiment toward
emerging markets worsened, and aggregate bond issuance fell.  But as Figure 2 shows, average
primary (launch) spreads also declined in 1995, since only relatively creditworthy borrowers were
still able to access the market.
14  Moreover, it would appear that borrowers who retained market
access even under these difficult circumstances were also less subject (than those screened out) to
distrust arising from easy rescheduling, since the ratio of spreads under UK relative to US law
meanwhile declined.  In contrast, in 1998, when there was a more widespread crisis and
generalized reduction in market access, spreads again widened, but this time the distrust
associated with easy rescheduling simultaneously rose (as reflected in the ratio of UK- to US-law
spreads).  
Again, these observations highlight the importance of correcting for both selectivity and
endogeneity when attempting to estimate the associated effects.15The full set of results for these multinominal logits is presented in Appendix 1.
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4.  Methodology
The typical model employed in studies of emerging-market spreads is a linear relationship
of the form:
log (spread) = BX + u1                                                                                                                                                     (1)
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the spread, X is a vector of issue, issuer, and
period characteristics, and u1 is a random error.  
Such models are commonly estimated by ordinary-least squares.  But OLS will be biased if
the choice of governing law is endogenous or the sample of observed issuers differs from the
population of potential issuers.  To deal with simultaneity, we estimate equation (1) using
modified instrument variables.  We first use a multinominal logit to determine the choice of
governing law (where we take US, UK and other as the three alternatives).
15  We then construct
the fitted probability that a particular bond is governed by one of these laws and use the estimated
probabilities rather than the actual values in our second-stage regression.  
Even with the choice of governing law instrumented in this way, equation (1) will not
provide an unbiased estimate of the relationship between governing laws and spreads if not all
potential issuers are in the sample.  The spread (and its relationship to issuer and issuer
characteristics) will be observed only when positive decisions to borrow and lend are made.
Assume that spreads are only observed when a latent variable B crosses a threshold B’ defined by:16 Maddala (1983) describes a methodology for implementing a double selection model, which
extends Heckman’s approach by estimating two Inverse Mills ratios for the two choices (borrow
or not to borrow and the governing law under which to borrow).  That approach is not
straightforward to apply here because the governing law involves three choices, whereas the
method proposed by Maddala is based on two probits (or a bivariate probit) implying a choice
between two options in each case.  There is also a common-sensical justification for our
approach: namely, that a selectivity-correction should be used when not all outcomes are
observed, but that instrumental variables are appropriate when one observes the dependent
variable in all cases since the instrumental variables estimator is predicated on fewer strong
assumptions.  
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B’ = gX’ + u2                                                                                                             (2)
where X’ is the vector of variables that determines the desire of borrowers to borrow and the
willingness of lenders to lend, and u2 is a second error term.  If the error terms in equations (1)
and (2) are bivariate normal with standard deviations s1 and s2 and covariance s12
2/s1s2, this is a
sample selection model a la Heckman (1979), and equations (1) and (2) can be estimated
simultaneously. They can be identified by the nonlinearity of the fitted probabilities in the selection
equation or by the inclusion of elements in X’ that are not also in X, and the resulting two-
equation system can be estimated by maximum likelihood. 
In what follows we report several estimates of our spreads equation: an OLS estimate, an
IV estimate which substitutes estimated probabilities for actual governing laws, a selectivity-
corrected model that estimates the issue and pricing decisions simultaneously, and a model that
both estimates the issue and pricing decisions simultaneously and controls for the endogeneity of
the choice of governing law.
16  We regard the results obtained from this last model as definitive,13
but reporting all our results allows the reader to form his own opinion. 
5.  Data and Variables
We estimated this model using data for primary spreads for developing-country bonds
issued in the period 1991-98.  From Bondware we gathered data on the maturity of each issue,
whether it was privately placed, whether the issuer was a private or governmental entity, whether
the issue was denominated in dollars, yen or deutschmarks, whether the interest rate was fixed or
floating, and the governing law.  Building on our earlier work on the bond market, we included as
measures of creditworthiness the external debt relative to GNP, debt service relative to exports, a
dummy variable for whether the country had concluded a debt restructuring agreement with
private or official creditors in the preceding year, international reserves relative to short-term
debt, the ratio of short-term debt to total commercial bank debt, the ratio of outstanding bank
credit to the private sector relative to GDP, the growth rate of real GDP, and the variance of the
export growth rate.  Additional variables not considered in our earlier analysis of bond-market
spreads but included here are the ratio of short-term debt to total commercial bank debt, the ratio
of reserves to short-term debt, and the ratio of domestic private credit to GDP.  We added these
because we found them to be important in a subsequent analysis of spreads on syndicated bank
loans (Eichengreen and Mody 1999b) and now suspect that they might also play a role in the bond
market.
We also included a measure of country credit worthiness derived from Institutional17 The advantage of the Institutional Investor data over the Moody’s/S&P ratings used by most
previous authors is more complete country coverage and more regular publication.  (The data are
biannual.)
18 In addition to entering these variables in levels, we included interaction terms for each,
interacting them with a dummy variable for Latin America. The coefficients on 9 of the 10
independent variables entered with coefficients that differed from zero at the 95 per cent
confidence level. (The one exception was the interaction term between the debt/GNP ratio and the
Latin America dummy.) The signs of the coefficients are intuitively plausible. Larger reserves, less
debt, faster growth and more stable export growth all improve the credit rating, while a recent
history of debt rescheduling worsens it. High reserves matter more for credit worthiness in Latin
America, while fast growth, stable exports and a recent history of rescheduling matter less.  The
full equation is reported in Eichengreen and Mody (1998a).
  
19 The average term to maturity was 6 to 8 years, depending on which of the samples used below
was considered.  The ten-year note was also used by previous authors such as Cline and Barnes
(1997), which therefore enhances comparability.  The use of the yield curve also brings into play
the role of short-term interest rates.
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Investor.
17  Since the raw country credit rating is correlated with (and constructed by the rating
agencies partly as a function of) other issuer characteristics, its inclusion creates potential
problems of multicolinearity and complicates interpretation.  We therefore employed the residual
from a first-stage regression in which the credit rating was regressed on the ratio of debt to GNP,
the debt rescheduling dummy, the ratio of reserves to GNP, the rate of GDP growth, and the
variance of export growth.
18  Since this is a residual from a regression of credit ratings on
observable economic characteristics, we interpret it as capturing political risk.
To proxy for industrial-country credit conditions, we used the yield on ten-year U.S.
treasury bonds.  Ten-year rates are appropriate since the term to maturity of the underlying asset
roughly coincides with that on the international bonds in our sample.  We also include a measure
of the yield curve, the log of the difference between the ten-year and one-year U.S. treasury
rates.
1920 For a more complete discussion of these results, see Eichengreen and Mody (1998a). 
21 That is (to repeat), we include only the credit rating residual from a first-stage regression of the
credit rating on country characteristics.
22Other governing laws (mainly German and Japanese) enter with a negative coefficient.  As noted
above, we suspect that this is picking up the impact on spreads of borrowers’ ability to access the
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Finally, estimating equation (2) requires information on those who did not issue bonds.
For each country we considered for three types of issuers: sovereign, public, and private. For each
quarter and country where one of these issuers did not come to the market, we recorded a zero,
and where they did we recorded a one.
6. Basic Results
Table 3 reports the basic results and different econometric treatments.  Our preferred
estimates, correcting for both the endogeneity of the choice of governing law and the selectivity
associated with the borrowing decision, are in the fourth column.   Country and borrower
characteristics generally enter with plausible signs and coefficients.
20   Fast growing countries pay
relatively low spreads, for example, while countries with a recent history of debt-servicing
difficulties pay high ones.  Borrowers from countries with good credit ratings, controlling for their
observable macroeconomics characteristics, pay relatively low spreads.
21
The critical variable is the dummy for UK (versus U.S.) law.  Its coefficient is negative but
insignificantly different from zero at standard confidence levels.  This zero coefficient is
inconsistent with the view that the markets severely penalize emerging-market borrowers using
collective-action clauses.
22German and, particularly, the Japanese market, where for much of the period funds were cheap and
spreads were especially narrow.
23Correcting for endogeneity would increase the absolute value of the coefficient on  UK governing
law if unobserved characteristics that lead to lower spreads also lead to a higher probability of
issuance under UK law.  Thus, characteristics of borrowers which make UK-law issuers more
creditworthy than issuers under U.S. law are attributed to the UK law itself.  Correction for selection
bias works in an offsetting manner.  The negative coefficient on the Inverse Mills ratio, denoted
lambda, implies that borrowers not expected to float an issue who come to the market anyway do so
because they have unobserved characteristics that work to enhance their creditworthiness, which in
turn reduces the spreads that pay (see also Eichengreen and Mody 1998a).  However, bonds not
predicted to be issued and placed under UK law gain less in terms of lower spreads than do bonds
similar in other respects but issued under U.S. law.  This bias against the UK law could be
meaningful.  For example, when market conditions turn poor, new issuance under UK laws would
decline and relative spreads increase.  Petas and Rahman (1999) show for Kazakhstan and Philippines
that during the Russian crisis, the secondary spreads on UK bonds rose more than under US law
bonds.
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The other columns illustrate the sensitivity of this result to econometric treatment.  The
OLS regression in the first column wipes out the negative (if insignificant) coefficient obtained
using our preferred treatment.  The instrumental-variables estimate in the second column, which
substitutes fitted probabilities that a bond is governed by a particular law for the actual values,
yields a positive rather than a negative coefficient.  On the other hand, correcting for selectivity
without controlling for the endogeneity of the choice of governing law (column 3), yields a larger
negative coefficient (with higher statistical significance) than the OLS estimates.  It would appear
that the OLS estimates are not too different from our preferred estimates of the effect of UK
governing law because the biases imparted by failing to correct for selectivity and endogeneity
work in opposite directions.
23   24Note that we now use the unadjusted credit ratings rather than the residuals from a first-stage
equation.
25We also estimate the probit for the issue decision separately for each subsample; the Inverse Mills
ratios in Table 5 are constructed from these subsample estimates.  Note that the debt rescheduling
variable does not appear for subsamples for credit ratings above 50 because there were no post-1990
debt reschedulings for borrowers with those ratings (not surprisingly given how credit ratings are
constructed).  In addition, we dropped the share of short-term debt in total debt, since this variable
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7.  Differential Effects with Different Credit Ratings
When we distinguish between more and less credit-worthy borrowers, we obtain sharper
results.  In Table 4 we interact the dummy variables for governing law (or the predicted
probabilities of issuance under a particular law) with the four credit-rating categories in Figure
1.
24  The omitted alternative is the lowest rating category  (0-30 on the Institutional Investor
scale), for which the effect of the choice of UK governing law can therefore simply be read off
from the zero-one governing law dummy.  Now there is a strong negative coefficient on UK law
for borrowers from the most credit-worthy countries.  The coefficient on the interaction term
differs significantly from zero at the 95 per cent confidence level.  The funding cost advantage of
the highest rated category, according to this estimate, is given by the sum of the coefficients on
the dummy variable for the UK governing law plus its interaction with the highest credit-rating
category, which is about -0.45.  In other words, the spread paid by borrowers from countries with
high credit ratings are about 45 per cent lower when they opt for the UK law rather than the U.S.
law.   A chi-squared test indicates that the sum of the coefficients differs from zero at the 95 per
cent confidence level. 
We can further analyze the robustness of these results, and of our specification generally,
by estimating the same model separately for each of our separate credit-rating categories.
25  Inhad a correlation of nearly 0.5 with the debt/GDP ratio, and the maximum likelihood estimator
converged more smoothly without it.  The same is the case of the dummy variable for fixed-rate
issues, which was highly correlated with the dummy variable for public issuers.
26 The relatively small number of observations in the higher credit-rating categories required paring
down the number of explanatory variables.
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Table 5, column 1, we present results for low rated issuers, i.e., issuers with Institutional Investor
rating less than 50, and in column 2 for high rated issuers, i.e., issuers with ratings above 50. 
Columns (3) through (6) further subdivide low and high rated issuers (0-30, 30-50, 50-70, and
70-100).  Allowing for the possibility of differences across rating categories of other country and
issuer characteristics would seem sensible; there is no reason to think that the only place these
would show up is in the governing law variable.  Strikingly, this more flexible set of estimates
only reinforces our results.  We find a positive and significant coefficient on UK law for the low
credit category (column 1), and a negative coefficient and significant for the high categories.  We
also now obtain a significant positive coefficient for the second lowest credit rating category
(0.28, with a t-statistic of 1.83).  The further breakdown shows that the effects shift smoothly
from a large positive impact of UK governing laws on spreads to a substantial negative impact as
we move up the credit quality gradient.  The impact is particularly strong at the two extremes (0-
30 and 70-100).
26
An explanation for this pattern is as follows.  More credit-worthy emerging-market
borrowers value their capital-market access and are unlikely to walk away from their debts. 
Including collective-action clauses in their loan contracts is not a significant source of moral
hazard.  Indeed, in the exceptional circumstance that they have difficulties in servicing their debts,19
the fact that they can resort to provisions facilitating the orderly restructuring of their obligations
is viewed positively by the markets.  For less credit-worthy borrowers, in contrast, the presence of
collective-action clauses significantly aggravates moral hazard and increases borrowing costs. 
Still, the fact that collective-action clauses allow such borrowers to restructure in a more orderly
fashion is attractive to their creditors.  The two effects tend to work in opposite directions,
resulting in a relatively small and insignificant overall impact on borrowing costs. 
8.  Limitations of the Analysis
In this section we discuss some potential limitations of the analysis reported above.  First,
there is the danger that we may be mismeasuring the presence or absence of collective action
clauses.  We have information on the governing law (U.S., UK or other) for each bond issue.  In
fact, there are a few instances where provisions for collective representation of the bondholders
are included in bonds governed by U.S. law and where no such provisions are included in bonds
governed by UK law.  The standard treatment for this kind of measurement error is to instrument
the variable in question, which is what we do in the empirical analysis above.  If it is the presence
or absence of collective action clauses rather than the choice of governing law per se that affects
emerging market spreads and if the governing law measures the presence of collective action
clauses with random error, then the use of instrumental variables should provide a reliable
indication of the magnitude and significance of the effect.
Second, there is the possibility that we are picking up the characteristics of the market in
which the bond is issued (London or New York) and its implications for borrowing costs, rather27 The fact that bonds subject to “other” governing laws (mainly Japanese and German) have
unusually narrow spreads alert us to this possibility, since these markets may have been difficult for
some borrowers to access despite the fact that spreads were unusually low — especially in Japan —
for much of the period in question. 
28The key results continue to hold whether we estimate the model on the full sample or separately for
countries with credit ratings above and below 50.  The U.S.-UK interest differential tends to show
up with a positive and significant coefficient for the subsample of countries with low credit ratings,
but a zero coefficient for the subsample of countries with high credit ratings.
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than the impact of the associated governing law and contractual provisions.
27   We have already
attempted to sort out these effects by including include in our empirical models a lengthy list of
economic and financial characteristics of the borrower and the market, which helps to control for
the impact of spreads on these other observable characteristics.  But, to probe further, we added
British interest rates to the spreads equation as an additional, direct measure of UK market
conditions.  Given its high correlation with U.S. rates, we entered the variable as the difference
between U.S. and UK Libor rates.  
This extension does not change our basic finding concerning the impact of choice of
governing laws on spreads.  There is only a slight reduction in the size of the positive coefficient
on UK law for borrowers with high credit ratings and no discernible change in the point estimate
for less credit-worthy borrowers.  There are no changes in levels of statistical significance.
28  This
is confirmation that what we are picking up are the effects of governing laws and associated
contractual provisions and not local credit-market conditions.
Third, there is the possibility that the markets began to focus on the implications of
collective action provisions only recently, and that they have therefore begun to price debt
securities accordingly only in recent quarters.  Since the likelihood of default was low in the first29
We also estimated the model for a variety of other subperiods and continued to obtain consistent
results, although levels of statistical significance varied.  Levels of statistical significance were also
reduced when we allowed the coefficients on the other independent variables to vary between the
earlier and later periods.  But as in Table 4, we continued to find relatively little impact on spreads for
borrowers from countries with low credit ratings, but a generally significant negative effect on spreads
for countries with high credit ratings.
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half of the 1990s and the international policy community was not concerned to see that private
investors “took a hit,” there may have been no particular reason to focus on the presence or
absence of these provisions; since the inauguration of discussions of private sector burden sharing,
in contrast, legal protections have become a prominent concern.  However, this hypothesis is
commonly invoked by authors seeking to explain why there appears to be little overall difference
in the spreads on issues governed by U.S. and UK law (Petas and Rahman 1999), where we in
fact find evidence of just such differential when we disaggregate by credit quality.  This suggests
that previous authors may have invoked a spurious hypothesis in order to explain a “nonfact.”  
Be that as it may, we can test this hypothesis by estimating our model separately for the
earlier and later parts of the decade.  Estimating the coefficients on governing laws (including
those interacted with the credit-rating categories) separately for 1991-1995 and 1996-1998, we
find that our key results hold for both subperiods: less credit-worthy borrowers who opt for UK
law pay higher spreads while more credit-worthy borrowers opting for UK law pay lower spreads
in both 1991-1995 and 1996-1998.  Even before the Asian crisis and the recent policy debate,
then, it appears that the markets took cognizance of the implications of legal provisions for
default risk and restructuring costs.
29  22
9.  Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper has marshaled the first systematic analysis of the impact on borrowing costs of
collective-action clauses designed to facilitate the orderly restructuring of emerging-market debt. 
It does so through comparisons of American- and British-style bonds.  The analysis is complicated
by the fact that borrowers are able to choose which type of security to issue.  It is further
complicated by the fact that borrowers can decide whether to borrow, lenders whether to lend. 
Our model attempts to take these complications on board.
The results caution that the impact of contract structure is discernible only when
borrowers are disaggregated by credit quality.  Results for the whole sample disguise differential
effects on borrowers with better and worse credit ratings.  Collective-action provisions tend to
reduce the cost of borrowing for the more credit-worthy issuers, who benefit from being able to
avail themselves of an orderly restructuring process.  For less credit-worthy issuers, in contrast,
there is evidence of higher spreads.  While the point estimates are sensitive to the exact
specification and sample chosen, the data show that low rated borrowers (rating less than 50 on
the Institutional Investor scale) pay a premium while higher rated borrowers (with rating above
50) earn a discount when issuing under the UK law.  We conjecture that for less credit-worthy
borrowers the advantages of provisions facilitating an orderly restructuring are offset by the moral
hazard and additional default risk associated with the presence of renegotiation-friendly loan
provisions.
The results do not support the dire consequences predicted by some market participants of
including collective-action clauses in loan contracts.  Moreover, the differential effects to which23
our analysis points suggest that collective-action clauses should become more attractive as
economic and financial development proceeds and emerging markets improve their credit
worthiness.  If the goal of strengthen to reform the international financial architecture is to
strengthen market discipline by encouraging investors to more generously reward more credit-
worthy borrowers and penalize less credit-worthy ones, then the more widespread adoption of
collective-action clauses, which would reduce borrowing costs for the more credit-worthy while
raising them for their less credit-worthy counterparts, would seem to be a step in the right
direction.    30 Strictly, because the multinomial logit estimates relative probabilities, the signs on the
coefficients for any one of the choices are not always the same as estimated when a full
accounting of the relative choices is made.
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Appendix 1: Multinomial Logit Results
In this appendix we report the results of estimating a multinomial logit for the choice
between the three governing laws, from which we construct the corresponding probabilities.  The
logit is highly significant as an equation, explains 35 percent of the variation in the dependent
variable, and many of the individual coefficients enter with plausible signs.  While some variables
point to a higher credit quality leading to a preference for UK over U.S. law, others suggest, as in
Figure 1, that especially low credit quality may lead to a preference for UK law.
30  Issuers
choosing UK law tend to have low debt/GNP ratios.  Public issuers other than sovereigns have a
lower probability of choosing UK law issuance relative to sovereigns; and private issuers,
presumably with the lowest credit, are least likely to issue under the UK law.  Latin American
borrowers, whose credit quality has generally been lower historically than that of East Asian
issuers, also have a lower probability of choosing UK law.  Working in the other direction, a low
credit rating residual (implying high political risk) and a low growth rate are positively associated
with the probability of preferring UK governing law.  The probability of choosing UK law
increases when maturities are short and loan amounts are small, consistent either with low credit
quality or with higher credit quality issuers who may wish to rollover frequently (as discussed
above in the context of Figure 1).25
Appendix Table 1 Multinominal logit results
Variable UK governing law Other governing laws




Private placement -0.27 -0.95
(-2.37) (-5.54)
Log of 10 year US. Treasury Rate 0.39 1.18
(0.673) (1.54)
Log (10 year - 1 year) Treasury Rate  0.39 0.84
(4.26) (6.45)




Debt Service/Exports 0.38 1.12
(0.78) (1.61)
GDP Growth -6.61 -27.62
(-0.83) (-2.74)
Standard Deviation of Export Growth -1.98 0.74
(-2.06) (0.63)
Ratio of Short Term Debt to Total Debt 1.69 -0.76
(2.21) (-0.77)
Reserves/Short Term Debt -0.09 0.04
(-1.38) (-0.46)
Ratio of Domestic Credit to GDP -0.23 0.22
(-3.27) (2.44)
Dummy for :
  Public Borrower  -0.58 -0.77
(-1.39) (-1.65)
  Private Borrower -0.94 -1.32
(-2.14) (-2.67)
  Supranational borrower 0.22 -0.81
(0.28) (-0.71)
  Israel -0.15 3.09
   (-0.12) (3.63)
  Latin America  -1.47 -1.35
  (-5.94) (-4.01)
  Japanese Yen issue 2.22 4.10
(6.55) (11.76)
  Deutch Mark issue 2.25 5.72
(4.52) (11.72)
  Other currencies' issue 2.07 3.31
(7.52) (10.94)
  Fixed rate issue -1.98 -0.74
(-11.07) (-3.08)
  Manufacturing Sector 0.14 -0.21
(0.62) (-0.62)
  Financial Services Sector 0.36 -0.14
(2.14) (-0.63)
  Other Services -0.09 0.34
(-0.32) (0.93)





Number of bonds 2551 2551
Pseudo R-square 0.36 0.36
Log of Likelihood -1737.64 -1737.64
* US. Governing law is used as the base.1 Credit to the private sector.
2 Cross-border bank claims in all currencies and local claims in non-local currencies of maturity up to
and including one year.
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Appendix 2: Data sources and construction of variables
Bond characteristics
The bond data set, obtained from Bondware, supplemented by the Emerging Markets
Division of the International Monetary Fund for the early 1990s, covers the period 1991 to 1998
and includes: (a) launch spreads over risk free rates (in basis points, where one basis point is one-
hundredth of a percentage point) (b) the amount of the issue (millions of US$); (c) the maturity in
years; (d) whether the borrower was a sovereign, other public sector entity, or private debtor; (e)
the governing law under which the bond contract was written; (f) currency of issue; (g)
borrower’s industrial sector: manufacturing, financial services, utility or infrastructure, other
services, or government (where government, in this case, refers to subsovereign entities and
central banks, which could not be classified in the other four industrial sectors); (h) the country
and regional identity of the borrower.
Country characteristics
Variable (billions) Periodicity Source Series
Total external debt
(EDT)












National annual WEO NGDP_R
Total debt service
(TDS)
US$ annual WEO DS
Exports (XGS) US$ annual WEO BX
Exports (X) US$ monthly IFS M#c|70__dzf
Reserves (RESIMF) US$ quarterly IFS q#c|_1l_dzf








US$ semi-annual BISVariable (billions) Periodicity Source Series
3Total consolidated cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims in non-local currencies.




















Standard deviation of Standard deviation of monthly growth rates of exports
export growth over six months
Reserves/Imports RESIMF/IMP
Reserves/Short-term debt RESIMF/BISSHT
Ratio of short-term debt BISSHT/BISTOT
to total debt
Ratio of Domestic Credit CLM_PVT/(GDPNC/4)
to GDP
SOURCES:
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) and International Financial
Statistics (IFS).
World Bank’s World Debt Tables (WDT) and Global Development Finance (GDF).
Bank of International Settlements’ The Maturity, Sectoral  and Nationality Distribution of
International Bank Lending. 
Credit ratings were obtained from Institutional Investor's Country Credit Ratings. 
Missing data for some countries was completed using the US State Department's Annual 
Country reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices (which are available on the
internet from http:www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/trade_reports/).
U.S. interest rates 
http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/releases/H15/data/b/tcm3y.txt28
Table 1: Spreads, maturities, and bonds issued under different governing laws
 Governing
Law
Year and indicator U.K. U.S. Other Average*
1991 Spread 259 384 237 274
Maturity 4 4 5 5
Number of bonds 39 15 48 102
1992 Spread 348 387 233 343
Maturity 4 5 5 4
Number of bonds 63 61 65 189
1993 Spread 339 340 210 321
Maturity 4 6 5 5
Number of bonds 168 113 99 380
1994 Spread 203 298 172 218
Maturity 5 7 7 6
Number of bonds 172 74 89 335
1995 Spread 169 315 201 209
Maturity 5 7 6 5
Number of bonds 179 83 82 344
1996 Spread 188 308 196 228
Maturity 5 10 7 7
Number of bonds 248 166 101 515
1997 Spread 220 259 195 234
Maturity 6 12 6 9
Number of bonds 218 216 87 521
1998 Spread 379 391 409 390
Maturity 7 9 6 8
Number of bonds 73 112 48 233
Average* Spread 236 317 217 261
Maturity 5 9 6 6
Number of bonds  1160 840 619 2619
Note: * Figures for number of bonds  represent total number.29
Table 2: Bond issuance by region and type of issuer
Average credit
ratings**
 Sovereign Issuer Public Issuer  Private Issuer
Region and indicator UK law US law Other laws Average* UK law US law Other laws Average* UK law US law Other laws Average*
East Europe 40.7
  Spread 365 211 267 303 224 278 209 224 319 411 143 318
  Maturity 6 12 7 7 4 5 5 5 5 7 5 5
  Number of bonds 40 6 70 116 12 4 17 33 33 10 27 70
Middle East and North Africa 40.8
  Spread 316 279 156 230 272 249 388 277 186 311 232 249
  Maturity 5 8 8 7 3 20 6 11 9 7 4 8
  Number of bonds 22 19 55 96 5 8 8 21 14 15 4 33
East Asia 63.9
  Spread 125 174 66 116 76 118 86 87 106 238 152 138
  Maturity 5 23 8 12 5 13 6 7 5 10 6 6
  Number of bonds 13 16 22 51 144 60 107 311 381 119 76 576
Caribbean 30.8
  Spread 489 376 433 186 186 350 350
  Maturity 5 8 7 3 3 8 8
  Number of bonds 4 4 8 1 1 4 4
Latin America 37.6
  Spread 277 299 307 295 323 304 350 318 425 387 369 401
  Maturity 6 10 7 8 5 9 4 6 4 7 4 5
  Number of bonds 71 86 76 233 81 86 49 216 299 390 92 781
South Asia 42.8
  Spread 301 301 137 160 138 187 235
  Maturity 4 4 7 10 10 7 7 34 3 16
  Number of bonds 4 4 13 1 1 15 14 8 1 23
Sub-Saharan Africa 40.9
  Spread 115 198 156 166 131 131 205 205
  Maturity 7 12 5 7 17 5 10 20 10 5 11
  Number of bonds 3 3 5 11 4 6 10 2 1 3 6
Average* 47.6
  Spread 303 277 234 267 164 231 155 181 248 352 254 288
  Maturity 6 11 7 8 5 11 6 7 5 8 5 6
  Number of bonds 157 134 228 519 260 159 188 607 743 547 203 1493
Note: * Figures for number of bonds  represent total number.
             ** Institutional Investors' scale of 0 (low) to 100 (high). Applies only to bond issuers.30
Table 3: Governing laws and spreads: alternative econometric treatments
OLS with predicted  Selectivity correction Predicted values for 
Variable OLS values for governing with no instrumental  governing laws and 
laws variables selectivity correction
Log Amount -0.039 -0.034 -0.034 -0.051
(-2.235) (-1.658) (-2.068) (-2.689)
Maturity 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.00004
(0.763) (0.496) (0.858) (0.015)
Private placement 0.067 0.058 0.064 0.036
(2.447) (1.826) (2.458) (1.198)
Log of 10 year US. Treasury Rate -0.286 -0.259 -0.226 -0.205
(-2.019) (-1.815) (-1.527) (-1.377)
Log (10 year - 1 year) Treasury Rate  -0.084 -0.071 -0.039 -0.020
(-3.896) (-2.938) (-1.730) (-0.816)
Credit Rating Residual -0.034 -0.034 -0.048 -0.048
(-20.646) (-18.153) (-26.576) (-24.324)
Debt/GNP 0.959 1.009 1.577 1.572
(9.004) (9.162) (14.619) (14.159)
Debt Rescheduled in Previous Year 0.180 0.159 0.189 0.183
(4.396) (3.884) (4.287) (4.157)
GDP Growth -8.123 -6.471 -12.519 -13.393
(-4.555) (-3.372) (-6.725) (-6.967)
Standard Deviation of Export Growth 0.886 1.011 2.186 2.238
(4.247) (4.670) (9.883) (9.843)
Short Term  to Total Debt -0.19 -0.196 0.714 0.673
(-0.109) (-1.031) (4.195) (3.614)
Reserves/Short Term Debt -0.084 -0.085 -0.009   -0.008  
(-5.711) (-5.835) (-0.627) (-0.582)
Ratio of Domestic Credit to GDP -0.028 -0.011 -0.057  -0.050
(-1.985) (-0.644) (-3.780) (-2.913)
Dummy for :
  Public Borrower  -0.079 -0.096 -0.028 -0.059
(-1.018) (-1.205) (-0.398) (-0.820)
  Private Borrower 0.122  0.111 -0.034 -0.078
(1.465) ( 1.277) (–0.462) (-0.998)
  Supranational borrower -1.156 -1.199 -1.044 -1.092
(-6.307) (-6.471) (-6.425) (-6.644)
  Israel -2.148 -1.927 -1.948 -1.764
   (-13.430) (- 9.555) (-14.563) (-10.196)
  Latin America 0.418 0.434 0.070 0.052
  (10.678) (10.557) (1.699) (1.188)
  Japanese Yen issue -0.238 -0.098 -0.224 -0.056
(-4.269) (-0.859) (-4.435) (-0.530)
  Deutch Mark issue -0.047 0.196 -0.028 0.201
(-0.749) (1.245) (-0.505) (1.396)
  Other currencies' issue -0.013 0.033 -0.059 0.021
(-0.193) (0.413) (-0.944) (0.280)
  Fixed rate issue 0.422 0.526 0.383 0.381
(10.565) (8.401) (10.262) (6.450)
  Manufacturing Sector 0.109 0.094 0.116 0.114
(1.984) (1.709) (2.139) (2.089)
  Financial Services Sector -0.081 -0.108 -0.060 -0.062
(-2.022) (-2.545) (-1.576) (-1.519)
  Other Services 0.229 0.257 0.251 0.264
(3.526) (3.915) (3.848) (4.003)
  Government entities -0.032 -0.055 0.013 -0.002
(-0.414) (-0.702) (0.194) (-0.036)
  U.K. governing law* 0.002 0.215 -0.043 -0.134
(0.070) (1.550) (-1.287) (-1.017)
  Other governing law* -0.041 -0.301 -0.056 -0.432
(-0.802) (-1.352) (-1.214) (-2.106)
Constant 5.472 5.282 5.338 5.546
(16.623) (14.119) (16.027) (14.947)
Lambda -0.589 -0.590
(-24.107) (-24.191)
Number of bonds 2235 2217 2217 2217
Adjusted R-square 0.6082 0.6134    
Log of Likelihood -4473.47  -4472.098
* US Governing law as the base.31
Table 4: Implications of governing laws for different credit rating categories: pooled results
OLS with predicted  Predicted values for 
Variable OLS values for governing governing laws and 
laws selectivity correction
Log Amount -0.049 -0.036 -0.052
(-2.800) (-1.777) (-2.733)
Maturity 0.001 0.001 -0.0006
(0.468) (0.479) (-0.258)
Private placement 0.073 0.082 0.061
(2.676) (2.622) (2.054)
Log of 10 year US. Treasury Rate -0.222 -0.219 -0.161
(-1.563) (-1.549) (-1.091)
Log (10 year - 1 year) Treasury Rate  -0.101 -0.101 -0.053
(-4.584) (-4.080) (-2.128)
Credit Rating Residual -0.028 -0.028 -0.043
(-13.785) (-10.724) (-16.270)
Debt/GNP 0.785 0.789 1.378
(7.204) (6.988) (12.029)
Debt Rescheduling in Previous Year 0.166 0.175 0.188
(3.933) (4.120) (4.144)
GDP Growth -7.396 -6.080 -12.748
(-4.115) (-3.120) (-6.534)
Standard Deviation of Export Growth 0.759 0.855 2.028
(3.615) (3.839) (8.737)
Short Term to Total Debt 0.067 -0.131 0.692
(0.392) (-0.696) (3.743)
Reserves/Short Term Debt -0.082  -0.076   -0.0007 
(-5.609) (-5.199) (-0.051)
Ratio of Domestic Credit to GDP -0.052 -0.039 -0.072
(-3.308) (-2.198) (-3.977)
U.K. governing law* 0.071 0.166 -0.142
(1.114) (1.034) (-0.930)
UK governing law interactions with:
  Rating 30-50 -0.055 0.016 -0.091
(-0.856) (0.160) (-0.972)
  Rating 50-70 -0.049 0.258 0.177
(-0.565) (1.866) (1.387)
  Rating 70-90 -0.434 -0.269 -0.307
(-4.215) (-1.671) (-2.029)
Other governing law* -0.031 0.229 0.075
(-0.265) (0.778) (0.279)
Other governing law interactions with:
  Rating 30-50 0.066 -0.243 -0.261
(0.552) (-1.231) (-1.489)
  Rating 50-70 -0.078 -0.775 -0.745
(-0.566) (-3.376) (-3.618)
  Rating 70-90 -0.339 -10.968 -0.576
(-2.108) (-3.798) (-2.407)




Number of bonds 2235 2217 2217
Adjusted R-square 0.6149 0.6252
Log of Likelihood -4444.011
Note:  Dummy variables for public, private, supranational, Israel, Latin America, currencies, and  
            industrial sectors are included in the regression but not reported here.
* US Governing law as the base.32




to or more than 50
 Credit rating less
than 30
Credit rating 30 or
more but less than
50
  Credit rating 50 or
more but below 70 
Credit rating 70 to
100  Variable
Log Amount -0.061 -0.106 0.029 -0.065 -0.093 -0.128
(-2.951) (-3.025) (0.449) (-3.015) (-2.530) (-1.864)
Maturity 0.004 0.002  0.015 0.004 0.005 -0.022
(1.710) (0.527) (1.138) (1.396) (1.177) (-1.402)
Private placement 0.034 0.078 0.077 0.043 -0.055 0.207
(1.160) (1.221) (1.007) (1.341) (-0.832) (1.718)
Log of 10 year US. Treasury Rate -0.296 -0.213 -0.602 -0.051 0.264 0.091
(-1.988) (-0.739) (-1.579) (-0.301) (0.851) (0.090)
Log (10 year - 1 year) Treasuries -0.058 -0.027 -0.091 -0.081 -0.109 -0.316
(-2.312) (-0.520) (-0.910) (-2.996) (-1.873) (-1.033)
Credit Rating Residual -0.032 -0.076 -0.019 -0.029 -0.088 -0.141
(-11.073) (-15.953) (-1.494) (-7.879) (-13.563) (-2.289)
Debt/GNP 1.596 1.191 0.579 1.247 0.777 2.947
(11.292) (6.128) (1.724) (7.365) (3.639) (1.131)
Rescheduling in Previous Year 0.117 0.163 0.110
(3.080) (1.501) (2.367)
GDP Growth -6.059 -36.325 -10.772 -6.585 -37.039 -105.847
(-3.230) (-6.561) (-2.299) (-3.054) (-6.482) (-1.558)
Standard Dev. of Export Growth 1.732 4.583 -0.492 1.712 4.940 4.809
(8.081) (6.216) (-0.810) (7.137) (6.392) (1.624)
Ratio of Short Term to Total Debt 0.662 1.102 0.041 0.072 -0.107
(3.397) (2.529) (0.084) (0.312) (-0.220)
Reserves/Short Term Debt -0.062 0.100 -0.038 -0.112 -0.023 0.224
(-4.429) (3.210) (-1.460) (-5.609) (-0.612) (1.193)
Ratio of Domestic Credit to GDP -0.199 -0.152 -0.097 -0.223 -0.199 -0.293
(-7.591) (-4.396) (-1.941) (-6.693) (-5.852) (-0.938)
  U.K. governing law* 0.302 -0.810 1.229 0.279 -0.802 -0.879
(2.092) (-2.816) (2.770) (1.828) (-2.857) (-2.435)
  Other governing law* 0.099 -0.923 1.779 -0.254 -1.308 0.935
(0.459) (-2.344) (2.566) (-1.083) (-3.170) (1.197)
Constant 5.751 6.869 4.419 5.542 7.553 9.388
(1.274) (9.692) (4.063) (12.700) (10.076) (2.939)
Lambda -0.479 -0.548 -0.057   -0.470 -0.664 -0.070
(-17.747) (-12.028) (-0.979) (-17.695) (-17.958) (-0.443)
Number of bonds 1395 822 271 1124 557 265
Log of Likelihood -2523.514  -1433.201 -512.055  -1866.668 -969.2234 -337.7328
Note:  Dummy variables for public, private, supranational, Israel, Latin America, currencies, and  
            industrial sectors are included as needed in the regression but not           
         reported here.


































































































Figure 2: Comparison of issuance and spreads under
 UK and US governing laws35
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